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INTEREST ANALYSIS, "MULTISTATE POLICIES,"
AND CONSIDERATIONS OF FAIRNESS
IN CONFLICTS TORTS CASES
ROBERT A. SEDLER*
I. INTRODUCTION
When we look at "American Conflicts of Law at the Dawn
of the 21st Century," we should begin by recognizing that the
last third of the twentieth century has seen a dramatic and revo-
lutionary change in our thinking about choice of law. Despite
intense academic disagreement about preferred approaches to
choice of law, about the need for rules versus case-by-case adju-
dication, about the meaning of "conflicts justice," and about all
the other matters that comprise the themes of conflicts symposia,
one salient fact stands out: policy analysis has come to the fore-
front of choice of law. Policy analysis is an essential component
of every modern approach to choice of law. The primary disa-
greement among academic commentators is over which policies
should be emphasized in determining choice of law' and how
courts should resolve cases that present conflicting policies.2
It is fair to say that Brainerd Currie's interest analysis ap-
proach has been the catalyst for the emergence of policy analysis
as the predominant feature of choice of law in the United States
today. Under Currie's interest analysis approach, the choice-of-
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University; J.D., University of Pittsburgh, 1959;
A.B., Wayne State University, 1956.
1. Such as whether the focus should be on the policies reflected in the differing
substantive laws of the involved states, or on "multistate policies" and policies pro-
moting "conflicts justice."
2. Such as whether the forum should apply its own law in order to implement the
policy reflected in that law or whether the courts should develop "neutral principles" to
accommodate the differing policies of the involved states.
3. As Professor John P. Dawson put it, when presenting Currie with the first Or-
der of the Coif Triennial Award, "It is clear after Brainerd Currie, that the dark sci-
ence called the conflict of laws can never be the same." The Dark Sience of Conflict,
TIME, Jan. 8, 1965, at 42-43.
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law decision is made exclusively with reference to the policies
and interests of the involved states; and where the forum has a
real interest in applying its own law in order to implement the
policy reflected in that law, Currie maintains that it should do
so.4 While most other modern approaches to choice of law reject
the underlying premises of Currie's interest analysis, these ap-
proaches nonetheless recognize the relevance of a consideration
of the policies and interests of the involved states in the choice-
of-law determination, and give at least some weight to a state's
interest in applyin its law in order to implement the policies re-
flected in that law.
II. INTEREST ANALYSIS IN CONFLICTS TORTS CASES
More importantly, in the "real world" of conflicts tort litiga-
tion, interest analysis has assumed surpassing importance. Al-
though only a small number of courts expressly follow the Currie
version of interest analysis as their articulated approach to
choice of law, the results the courts have reached in the conflicts
torts cases coming before them are generally consistent with the
results that would be reached under interest analysis. This in-
cludes the application of the forum's own law in the "true con-
flict" situation, where the forum and the other involved state
both have a real interest in having their law applied in order to
implement the policies reflected in those laws.6
4. See Robert A. Sedler, The Governmental Interest Approach to Choice of Law:
An Analysis and a Reformulation, 25 UCLA L. REV. 181, 183-90, 220-36 (1977); see
also Herma Hill Kay, A Defense of Currie's Governmental Interest, 215 RECUEIL DES
COURS 9, 38-77 (1989); Russell J. Weintraub, A Defense of Interest Analysis in the Con-
flict of Laws and the Use of That Analysis in Products Liability Cases, 46 OHIO STATE
L.J. 493,494-95 (1985).
5. The two modern approaches most favored by the courts, the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws "state of the most significant relationship" approach, and
Leflar's choice-influencing considerations, expressly include a consideration of the
policies and interests of the involved states as a relevant factor in the choice-of-law de-
cision. For a listing of the approaches followed by the different states in conflicts torts
cases, see Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in American Courts in 1997, 46 AM.
J. COMP. L. 233,266 (1998).
6. See Robert A. Sedler, A Real World Perspective on Choice of Law, 48 MERCER
L. REV. 781, 788-89 (1997); see also Sedler, supra note 4, at 190-220; Robert A. Sedler,
Interest Analysis and Forum Preference in the Conflict of Laws: A Response to the "New
Critics," 34 MERCER L. REV. 593, 635-43 (1983); Robert A. Sedler, Professor Juenger's
Challenge to the Interest Analysis Approach to Choice of Law: An Appreciation and a
Response, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 865,891-95 (1990).
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The reason the courts follow the interest analysis approach
in practice if not in name, I submit, is because, as Currie has em-
phasized, it seems rational to a court to make choice-of-law deci-
sions with reference to the policies and interests of the involved
states. In the "false conflict" situation, where only one state has
a real interest in applying its law in order to implement the poli-
cies reflected in that law, there is every reason for a court to ap-
ply the law of that state and no good reason not to apply it. In
the "true conflict" situation, it seems fully reasonable for a court
to apply its own law in order to advance its own policy and inter-
est, as long as this does not produce any unfairness to the party
against whom that law is being applied. Although academic
commentators may search endlessly for a "neutral" solution to
the "true conflict," the results in practice indicate that "neutral"
solutions do not have much appeal to the courts deciding the
cases that come before them.7
It may also be noted that interest analysis is "neutral and
non-judgmental." In conflicts torts cases, interest analysis does
not favor plaintiffs or defendants or support one view of tort law
over another. It does not classify a rule of substantive tort law as
"progressive" or "regressive," "good or bad." It looks only to
the policy reflected in a state's law and that state's interest in
applying its law in order to implement that policy in the particu-
lar case. As a state's law changes, its policies and interests will
change accordingly. The movement toward "tort reform," for
example, has resulted in rules of tort law in a number of states
that now favor defendants over plaintiffs.
The statement that "the results the courts have reached in the conflicts torts cases
are generally consistent with the results that would be reached under interest analysis"
obviously needs some qualification. With conflicts torts cases being decided by the
highest and intermediate appellate courts of 50 states and the District of Columbia, as
well as by federal courts of appeal and federal district courts applying the conflicts law
of the state in which they sit, there certainly will be some variation in results. Cases
will be found in which the results are not consistent with the results that would be
reached under interest analysis. I submit, however, that in percentage terms, the per-
centage of such cases is much lower than the percentage of cases in which the results
are consistent with the results that would be reached under interest analysis.
7. And even though interest analysis can only identify, but not resolve, the
"unprovided-for" case-the situation where the policies reflected in the laws of neither
state would be advanced by the application that state's law in the particular case-such
identification helps lead the courts to a means of resolution of the choice-of-law issue
in that situation. See Sedler, supra note 4, at 233-36 (discussing the "unprovided-for"
case).
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Suppose that state A has enacted a law limiting recovery for
noneconomic loss in tort cases. Prior to the change, state A
would have had a real interest in applying its law that allows un-
limited recovery whenever a state A resident was injured,
whether in state A or in another state, and whether by a state A
defendant or an out-of-state defendant. As a result of the
change in policy, state A's interest has now changed. State A
now has a real interest in applying its law that limits recovery for
noneconomic loss for the benefit of a state A defendant, again
whether the harm caused by the actions of a state A defendant
occurred in state A or in another state, and whether the victim is
a resident of state A or a resident of another state. As state A's
substantive law changed to benefit defendants rather than plain-
tiffs, state A's policies and interests have changed; but this
change does not affect the application of the interest analysis
approach by the state A courts at all.
III. A RESPONSE TO TWO CRITICISMS OF INTEREST ANALYSIS
From the time of its inception, the interest analysis ap-
proach has been subject to vehement academic attack in this
country and abroad, and the attack continues apace as we enter
the twenty-first century. While I and other strong supporters of
interest analysis periodically mount "comprehensive" defenses
against this criticism,8 in the context of this symposium, it is more
appropriate that we respond to specific criticisms, as Dean Kay
has done in regard to Professor Juenger's "time warp" criticism,
and to Judge Weinstein's criticism of interest analysis as being
an impractical "methodology in the world of global litigation
that now characterizes product liability." 9 This Article responds
to two specific and recurrent criticisms of interest analysis: (1)
that interest analysis fails to take into account "multistate poli-
cies;" and (2) that interest analysis ignores considerations of
fairness.
Because this Article focuses on the "real world" of conflicts
torts litigation, it uses this "real world" as the basis of its re-
sponse to these criticisms. It begins with the proposition that the
"real world" of conflicts torts litigation is essentially local and
8. See, e.g., Kay, supra note 4; Sedler, supra note 6; Weintraub, supra note 4.
9. Herma Hill Kay, Currie's Interest Analysis in the Twenty-First Century: Losing
the Battle, but Winning the War, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 123, 129-30 (2000).
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therefore readily lends itself to the use of interest analysis to re-
solve torts conflicts issues. Tort law reflects strong policies re-
lating to loss distribution, regulation of enterprise activity, and
deterrence of socially undesirable conduct. Thus, a state's inter-
est in applying its law is easily identified on the basis of local fac-
tors, namely a state's connection with the parties, the harm, and
the conduct giving rise to the harm.
In the United States, tort law rather than social insurance is
the primary method of providing compensation for accident vic-
tims and victims of socially undesirable conduct. Thus, where
the tort law of the plaintiff's home state is plaintiff-favoring, that
state has a real interest in applying its plaintiff-favoring law for
the benefit of a resident plaintiff who is injured in an accident,
regardless of where the accident occurred or where the defen-
dant resides."0 This is because the plaintiff will feel the conse-
quences of the accident and of imposing or denying liability in
the home state. The home state's interest in applying its plain-
tiff-favoring law is unaffected by the fact that the accident may
have occurred in another state or the fact that the defendant re-
sides in another state. And it makes no difference, insofar as the
interest of the plaintiff's home state is concerned, whether the
state where the accident occurred, or the conduct giving rise to
the accident, or the defendant's home state, is across the border,
across the continent, or across the ocean."
Conversely, where the law of the defendant's home state is
defendant-favoring, that state has the same real interest in ap-
plying its defendant-favoring law for the benefit of a resident de-
fendant or defendant engaged in substantial business activity
there because the consequences of imposing or denying liability
will be felt by the defendant in that state. Again, that interest is
10. Because most tort cases involve liability for accidents, the discussion will re-
volve around accident cases.
11. Where the defendant is a nonresident, the suit can be brought in the plaintiff's
home state, of course, only if jurisdiction can be obtained against the defendant there.
It will usually be possible to obtain jurisdiction in tort cases against a nonresident
manufacturer, including a foreign country manufacturer, that has shipped goods into
the forum and so will be deemed to have "directed its activities toward residents of the
forum." See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). Na-
tional and multinational corporations will also be subject to general jurisdiction in most
states on the basis of continuous and substantial business activity in that state, suffi-
cient to justify jurisdiction over them on a nonforum-related claim. See Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
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the same regardless of where the harm resulting from the defen-
dant's conduct occurred and regardless of who was injured by
that conduct. Where a state's law reflects a regulatory or ad-
monitory policy, the state has a real interest in applying its law to
impose liability for conduct occurring in that state, regardless of
the residence of the actor or the victim and regardless of where
the harm resulting from that conduct occurred.
This Article now applies interest analysis to a conflicts tort
case presenting a "true conflict," and in so doing responds to the
criticisms that (1) interest analysis fails to take into account
"multistate policies," and (2) interest analysis ignores considera-
tions of fairness. Because this Article uses the "real world" of
conflicts tort litigation, it is necessary at the outset to identify the
forum in which suit is being brought. In this "real world," the
question of choice of law cannot be separated fully from the
question of jurisdiction as it relates to the possible states in
which suit can be brought. Litigating lawyers know that the
choice-of-law result in a particular case and the possible out-
come of the case often may depend on the state where suit can
be brought. They quite realistically assume that a court is more
likely to apply its own law in preference to the law of another
state, and that where a state has a real interest in applying its law
in order to implement the policy reflected in that law, the courts
of that state likely will do so." This being so, plaintiffs' lawyers
will try to obtain jurisdiction in the state whose law is plaintiff-
favoring.
In my illustrative case, there has been a three-vehicle crash
in state B. One of the vehicles is an automobile driven by P, a
resident of state A. Another vehicle is an automobile being
12. See, e.g., In re Disaster at Detroit Metro. Airport, 750 F. Supp. 793 (E.D.
Mich. 1989) (applying Michigan law) (where manufacturer manufactured allegedly de-
fective airplane in California, which crashed in Michigan, killing Michigan victims and
victims from other states, California law imposing strict liability for design defect ap-
plied rather than Michigan law imposing liability only on the basis of negligence).
Where the law of a manufacturer's home state reflects a regulatory policy, such as a
law imposing strict liability or allowing the recovery of punitive damages, and the harm
occurs in another state, whose law on these issues is defendant-favoring, to a victim
resident in that state, a "false conflict" is presented. See id. at 801-04. The manufac-
turer's home state has a real interest in applying its law to implement the regulatory
policy reflected in that law, while the victim's home state has no real interest in apply-
ing its defendant-protecting law for the benefit of a non-resident manufacturer.
13. In other words, they assume that in the "true conflict situation," the forum is
likely to apply its own law.
[Vol. 37:233
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driven by D, a resident of state B. The third vehicle is a tractor-
trailer owned by T Trucking Co., an interstate trucking company
that does business in a number of states, including state A. At
the time of the accident, the tractor-trailer was on its way to de-
liver goods in state C. We will assume that the evidence would
support a finding that P was 50% at fault, the driver for T
Trucking Co. was 25% at fault, and D was 25% at fault. State A
law follows a regime of complete comparative negligence and
imposes joint and several liability. This means that under state
A law, P could recover 50% of his damages against T Trucking
Co. and against D, jointly and severally. Under state B law, the
plaintiff cannot recover anything unless the negligence of the de-
fendant was greater than the negligence of the plaintiff, and joint
and several liability has been abolished. This means that under
state B law, P could not recover against either defendant be-
cause P was 50% negligent.
Under interest analysis, if P were to sue in state B, state B
would apply its own law in order to implement the defendant-
favoring policies reflected in its law because both defendants are
residents of state B. P cannot sue D in state A, since state A
could not constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over D. But state
A can constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over T Trucking Co.
on the ground that it is engaged in "continuous and systematic
business activity in that state," sufficient to justify the exercise of
jurisdiction over it on a nonforum-related claim. In our exam-
ple, the state A courts are authorized to exercise jurisdiction
within constitutional limits, so P can and does sue T Trucking
Co. in a state A court. Under interest analysis, state A should
apply its own law on the issues of comparative negligence and
joint and several liability because, based on P's state A resi-
dence, state A has a real interest in applying its plaintiff-favoring
law for the benefit of P in this case.
This is the situation most decried by critics of the interest
analysis approach because the result is designed to differ de-
pending on where the suit is brought. 5 And in this situation,
14. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, 466 U.S. at 415-16.
15. Note, however, that in the "real world" of torts conflicts litigation, the suit
against T Trucking Co. will be brought only in state A. Our concern, therefore, should
not be with trying to come up with an "ideal solution" that will "satisfy" both state A
and state B, but with whether the result reached by the state A court, which is where
suit will be brought, is a result that is functionally sound and fair to the parties.
2001]
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some critics would fault interest analysis for failing to take into
account "multistate policies.'' I would respond to this criticism
by first asking, "what are the 'multistate policies' that the court
should take into account" in a conflicts tort case? I would also
ask whether the same "multistate policies" would apply if (1) the
accident occurred in state A instead of in state B or (2) if the ac-
cident occurred in state B while T Trucking Co. was on its way to
deliver a shipment of goods to state A?
In the tort area, it is difficult to identify or obtain any kind
of agreement on what are the relevant "multistate policies" that
the courts should consider in the choice-of-law determination.
Prior to tort reform, Professor Juenger argued, for example, that
"substandard tort law" should not be applied in multistate
cases.6 But Juenger's definition of "substandard tort law" was
built around the now largely abandoned defendant-favoring tort
rules, such as guest statutes, spousal immunity, or limitations on
wrongful death damages. The current trend in tort law is toward
limitation or even denial of tort recovery, designed to protect de-
fendants and insurers from what legislatures consider excessive
and improper liability for enterprise activity. 7 In light of this
current trend, how does a court, even if it were disposed to do
so, decide which rules of substantive tort law are "substandard"
and should not be applied in multistate cases?
In the final analysis, the question in any conflicts torts case
is whether the court should apply the plaintiff-favoring law of
one state or the defendant-favoring law of another state. It is
difficult to see what "multistate policies" could provide a
"neutral" and functionally sound solution to this question. 8 I
would submit, therefore, that the failure of interest analysis to
take into account "multistate policies" cannot be a valid objec-
tion to the use of interest analysis as the preferred means of re-
16. Frederich Juenger, General Course on Private International Law, 193 RECUEIL
DES COURS 119, 286-322 (1983).
17. See Sedler, supra note 6, at 896-98.
18. In our example, because the state A legislature has not adopted tort reform, it
would not be expected that the state A courts would find some "multistate policy" in
favor of limiting liability in torts cases and apply that policy to the detriment of the
policies reflected in state A tort law. Similarly, because the state B legislature has
adopted tort reform rules restricting recovery based on comparative negligence and
abolishing joint and several liability, it would not be expected that the state B court, in
the completely unlikely event that this suit had been brought there, would conclude
that "multistate policies" justify application of state A's plaintiff-favoring rules.
[Vol. 37:233
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solving conflicts torts cases.
We now turn to considerations of fairness. Contrary to the
contentions of the critics, interest analysis does not ignore con-
siderations of fairness. As I have pointed out many times, fair-
ness to the parties is an independent choice-of-law consideration,
built into any approach to choice of law. Because this is so, a
court will not apply its own law, despite a real interest in doing
so, where such application would be unfair to the party against
whom it is being applied.
In the tort area, fairness relates to foreseeability and reli-
ance. The application of a state's law may produce unfairness if
the party against whom that state's law is being applied could
not reasonably foresee the application of that law at the time the
party acted, and, in the circumstances presented, the party was
entitled to rely on the law of another state and conform its con-
duct to the requirements of that state's law. Although such cases
will be fairly rare, when they do occur, the forum will displace its
own law despite a real interest in having that law applied.' 9 To
this extent, considerations of fairness are necessarily built into
the interest analysis approach.
Let me give some examples of the situation where the dis-
placement of the forum's law can be explained in terms of fair-
ness considerations. In Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil
Co.," a "key employee" of a California corporation was injured
while at the defendant's facilities in Louisiana.21 It was assumed
for purposes of this case that California law allowed the corpora-
tion recovery of damages for injury to a "key employee" (the
California court subsequently held that it did not), while Louisi-
ana law did not.22 The California court, applying "comparative
impairment" to the resolution of a purported "true conflict,"
held that Louisiana's interest would be "more impaired" if its
law were not applied.23 In arriving at this conclusion, the court
emphasized that the defendant had to deal with employees from
many different states at its Louisiana facility, and that it would
19. See generally Robert A. Sedler, Interest Analysis, Party Expectations and Judi-
cial Method in Conflicts Torts Cases: Reflections on Cooney v. Osgood Machinery, Inc.,
59 BROOK. L. REV. 1323, 1328-30 (1994).
20. 583 P.2d 721 (Cal. 1978).
21. See id. at 722.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 726-28.
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most reasonably have anticipated a need for protection of
premises liability insurance, based on Louisiana law, under
which it could not incur tort liability for economic injury to the
victim's employer.24
In Barrett v. Foster Grant Co.,25 a New Hampshire employee
of a New Hampshire contractor suffered serious injuries while
working on an electrical transformer in Massachusetts and
brought suit in a federal court in New Hampshire against the
Massachusetts landowner.26 The landowner would not be liable
under Massachusetts law, under which the only duty imposed on
a landowner in these circumstances was to warn of hidden dan-27
gers. The plaintiff contended that New Hampshire law im-
posed a higher duty of care. 28 The court held that Massachusetts
law applied on the duty of care landowners owed to persons on
the land, emphasizing that the Massachusetts landowner was en-
titled to rely on the Massachusetts standard of care when acting
on the Massachusetts land.29
In Blakesly v. Wolford, ° a Pennsylvania resident was ad-
vised by her physician to have a complicated procedure per-
formed by a Texas oral surgeon. The Texas oral surgeon met
with the plaintiff when he was visiting in Pennsylvania, and ar-
ranged to perform the procedure at a hospital in Texas.3 The
operation was unsuccessful, and in fact, caused additional injury
to the plaintiff.32 In a malpractice action against the oral surgeon
in Pennsylvania (the oral surgeon made no objection to Pennsyl-
vania's exercise of jurisdiction, although such an objection might
have been sustained), the court held that Texas law, which was
more favorable to the defendant, applied on the issues of
"informed consent" and limitations on malpractice damages.
33
The court emphasized that the plaintiff voluntarily went to
Texas to have the procedure performed and, accordingly, the de-
24. See id. at 728-29.
25. 450 F.2d 1146 (lst Cir. 1971) (applying New Hampshire law).
26. See id. at 1148.
27. See id. at 1149.
28. See id. at 1152.
29. Id. at 1154.
30. 789 F.2d 236 (3d Cir. 1986) (applying Pennsylvania law).
31. See id. at 236-38.
32. See id.
33. See id.
[Vol. 37:233
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fendant was entitled to rely on the Texas law of informed con-
34
sent" and limited liability for damages.
In Bader v. Purdom,35 New York parents were visiting
friends in Ontario and left their small child unsupervised.36 The
child was injured by the friends' dog.37 The parents brought a
negligence action on behalf of the child against their friends in
New York.38 Realistically, of course, the suit was against their
friends' homeowners' insurer, and the insurer sought to recover
contribution and indemnity from the allegedly negligent parents,
which was permitted under Ontario law but not under New York
law.39 The New York court applied Ontario law, under the sec-
ond Neumeier rule. 40 Here it can be contended that the applica-
tion of New York law on the issue of contribution and indemnity
would have been unfair to the dogowners, the nominal defen-
dants in the case. Because they were acting in Ontario, they
were entitled to conform their conduct to the requirements of
Ontario law, under which the parents were responsible for the
child's protection. Thus, the dogowners would not have to be
concerned about the child's safety while the parents were pres-
ent.
Fairness considerations are also a factor in what I have
called the "ninth rule of choice of law." Under this "rule of
choice of law," an employer's tort liability to an employee who is
covered by worker's compensation and the liability of the em-
ployer for contribution to a third-party tortfeasor in a claim in-
volving that employee is determined by the law of the state
where the employer has taken out worker's compensation to
cover the particular employee. One of the reasons for this "rule
of choice of law" is that the employer is considered to be entitled
to rely on the law of the state where worker's compensation,
covering the particular employee, was taken out to immunize it
34. See id.
35. 841 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1988) (applying New York law).
36. See id. at 38.
37. See id. at 37.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 39-40.
40. Id. at 40. Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1972), established rules for
conflicts torts cases. Under the second Neumeier rule, where the plaintiff is from a recov-
ery state and the defendant is from a nonrecovery state, and the accident occurs in the
defendant's home state, the law of that state applies. See id. at 457.
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from tort liability to that employee.4'
Having looked at those cases where fairness considerations
influenced the choice-of-law decision, we now return to the T
41. See Sedler, supra note 19, at 1334-44. As a matter of due process, a state's law
may not constitutionally be applied when the application of that state's law would be
"fundamentally unfair" to the party against whom that state's law is being applied. See
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981). No conflicts torts case will be
found where a court has held that the application of a state's law would be
"fundamentally unfair" for due process purposes. This is because, as the above cases
indicate, a state will not apply its own law when the application of that law would pro-
duce some unfairness to the party against whom that state's law is being applied. This
being so, it is never necessary for a court to consider whether the application of its law
would be "fundamentally unfair" for due process purposes.
The only example of due process "fundamental unfairness" that I have seen oc-
curred in a case on which I consulted sometime in the mid-1980s. (There was no re-
ported decision, and the portion of my consulting report that I have retained does not
contain many details). In that case, a Michigan couple was vacationing with Canadian
friends in Ontario. They left their infant child in a tent, which caught fire when a lan-
tern in the tent fell over. The father attempted to rescue the child, and both the father
and the child perished in the fire. The mother brought suit against the lantern manu-
facturer in a federal court in Michigan, where the lantern manufacturer did extensive
business. The lantern manufacturer sought to add the tent manufacturer as a third
party defendant, alleging that the tent manufacturer was negligent in not making the
tent flame retardant. The tent manufacturer was an Ontario company that marketed
its tents throughout Canada. It did not market any tents in Michigan, but marketed
other products there, and so was subject to general jurisdiction in Michigan on the basis
of "systematic and continuous business activity." Under Ontario law and the laws of
all the other Canadian provinces, there was no requirement that tents be flame retar-
dant. Michigan law imposed such a requirement.
In order for the lantern manufacturer to sustain its claim that the Ontario tent
manufacturer should be added as a third party defendant, it had to show that the
Michigan plaintiff would be entitled to recover against that defendant for negligence.
Had the Michigan plaintiff brought her suit against the Ontario manufacturer, in terms
of "interest analysis," the "true conflict" would have been presented. Michigan would
have a real interest in applying its plaintiff-favoring rule for the benefit of the Michigan
plaintiff, while Ontario would have a real interest in applying its defendant-favoring
rule for the benefit of the Ontario defendant.
The lawyer for the Ontario tent manufacturer retained this author as a consultant
and he advised that, "The Michigan courts would hold that the tort liability of the Ontario
manufacturer in the instant case should be determined by Ontario law rather than by
Michigan law, because it would be fundamentally unfair to apply Michigan law rather
than Ontario law on the point in issue." Because the Ontario manufacturer did not mar-
ket any tents in Michigan, it could not foresee the application of Michigan law requiring
that tents be flame retardant and was entitled to rely on Ontario law, which did not im-
pose such a requirement, and conform its conduct to the requirements of Ontario law.
Here, because the application of Michigan's conduct-regulating rule was completely un-
foreseeable to the Ontario tent manufacturer, the application of Michigan law on this
point would be "fundamentally unfair" and thus violative of due process. The court did
not need to reach the constitutional question because it held that, under Michigan con-
flicts law, Ontario law would apply on the negligence question.
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Trucking Co. case. In this example, there is no unfairness to T
Trucking Co. in the application of state A's law on the issues of
comparative negligence and joint and several liability. Because
T Trucking Co. was engaged in continuous and systematic busi-
ness activity in state A, it could foresee one of its vehicles being
involved in an accident there, and its liability insurance obvi-
ously covered its state A operations. Thus, it could foresee being
held liable under the state A law of comparative negligence and
joint and several liability. In regard to foreseeability, it is com-
pletely irrelevant whether the particular accident involving one
of its vehicles occurred in that state.42 Moreover, the driver for T
Trucking would not have relied on the state B's law of compara-
tive negligence and joint and several liability at the time the
driver was involved in an accident there. This was not a case
where the defendant was entitled to rely on one state's law and
conform its conduct to the requirements of that state's law.
Because state A has a real interest in applying its law on the
issues of comparative negligence and joint and several liability,
and because there is no unfairness in the application of state A
law on these issues, state A should apply its own law in order to
implement the policies reflected in that law.43
42. In Allstate, because the insurance covered the vehicle while being driven in
Minnesota, the application of Minnesota law on the issue of the "stacking" of the in-
surance policies was foreseeable to Allstate, and it was completely irrelevant that the
particular accident involving the covered vehicle occurred in Wisconsin. See Allstate,
449 U.S. at 326-31 (Stevens, J., concurring).
43. The example case is based on Schwartz v. Consol. Freightways, 221 N.W.2d 665
(Minn. 1974). In that case a Minnesota resident was injured in an accident in Indiana with
trucks owned by an Ohio corporation and traveling to states other than Minnesota. See
id. at 666-67. The defendant did substantial business in Minnesota, and suit was brought
there. See id. at 667. The court applied Minnesota law allowing recovery on the basis of
comparative negligence, rather than the law of Indiana or Ohio, which would have barred
recovery due the plaintiff's contributory negligence. See id. at 669; see also Kenna v. So-
Fro Fabrics, Inc., 18 F.3d 623 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying North Dakota law) (where North
Dakota resident was injured in Minnesota store owned by company that did business in
both states, North Dakota's plaintiff-favoring rules relating to survival and wrongful death
applied over Minnesota's defendant-favoring rule); Pollack v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.,
939 F. Supp. 151 (D. Conn. 1996) (applying Connecticut law) (where Connecticut victims
were involved in accident resulting from the blowout of a tire manufactured by an Ohio
company in Illinois, Connecticut victim-favoring products law applied).
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IV. A CONCLUDING NOTE
In the "real world" of conflicts torts litigation, the applica-
tion of the interest analysis approach produces results that are
functionally sound and fair to the parties. Under the interest
analysis approach, the choice-of-law decision is made exclusively
with reference to the policies and interests of the involved states
and, by design, does not take into account "multistate policies."
Far from being a point of criticism, I submit that in conflicts torts
cases this is a point of strength. Tort law reflects strong policies
relating to loss distribution, regulation of enterprise activity, and
deterrence of socially undesirable conduct. States have "real"
interests in applying their plaintiff-favoring tort law for the bene-
fit of resident plaintiffs and their defendant-favoring tort law for
the benefit of resident defendants; this is because the conse-
quences of the accident and of imposing or denying liability will
be felt by the parties in their respective home states. States also
have a "real" interest in applying their laws reflecting a regula-
tory or admonitory policy to conduct occurring within that state.
It is difficult to come up with any "multistate policies" that
would provide a "neutral" and functionally sound solution to the
question of whether a court should apply plaintiff-favoring law
or defendant-favoring law. Thus, it seems fully rational for a
court when making a choice-of-law determination in a conflicts
torts case to make that determination with reference to the poli-
cies and interests of the involved states, and in the "true conflict"
situation for a court to apply its own law in order to implement
its own policy and interest.
Moreover, considerations of fairness are built into the inter-
est analysis approach, as they are in any approach to choice of
law. A court will not apply its own law, despite a real interest in
doing so, where the application of its own law may produce un-
fairness to the party against whom it is being applied. The appli-
cation of a state's law in a conflicts torts case could produce un-
fairness only where the party against whom that state's law is
being applied could not reasonably foresee the application of
that law at the time the party acted, and, in the circumstances
presented, was entitled to rely on the law of a state and conform
its conduct to the requirements of that state's law. Such cases
have always been fairly rare and, in the twenty-first century
world of interstate operations and a global economy, will be
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even more rare.
In the "real world" of conflicts torts cases, interest analysis
is the preferred approach to choice of law because it works. It
produces results that are functionally sound and fair to the par-
ties. The courts understand this, which is why they apply interest
analysis in practice to the cases coming before them for decision.
Perhaps, as we move further into the twenty-first century, the
academic commentators may catch up with the courts.
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